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Abstract
Recently, Batabyal (2005) has analyzed a game model of dowry determination in which a
mediator plays a key role. Batabyal’s analysis shows that the equilibrium dowry offers from the
bride and the groom optimally trade off the desire to make an assertive offer with the likelihood that
this offer will be selected by the mediator. We extend the Batabyal (2005) analysis by studying the
impact that learning—about the circumstances of a prospective marriage—by the mediator has on
the tripartite interaction between the bride, the groom, and the mediator. Specifically, we first
determine the optimal dowry offers from the bride and the groom in a separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Next, we show that the mediator perfectly infers the private information of the two
parties from their dowry offers and that he then uses this information in part to select his preferred
dowry offer.
Keywords: Arranged Marriage, Dowry, Learning, Mediator, Uncertainty
JEL Codes: O150, D810, J120
4For informative accounts of the phenomenon of dowry, the reader should refer to Bumiller (1990), Menski (1998), and Sheel (1999).
For more on decision making in arranged marriages, see Batabyal (2001, 2004), and Batabyal and Beladi (2003).
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1. Introduction
In contemporary times, the word “dowry” has many meanings. Even so, one standard
meaning of this word refers to the money, goods, or property that are offered by the family of a
prospective bride to the family of a prospective groom at the time of marriage. Although this
practice of making dowry payments was and is common in many parts of the world, today, it is most
common in countries such as India where a substantial proportion of all marriages are arranged.4 In
the case of India, Sheel (1999) has pointed out that the practice of making dowry payments can be
tracked back to Vedic times in which valuable clothes, jewelry, and other goods were routinely
given voluntarily to both the bride and to the groom’s families at the time of marriage. This tells us
that the initial purpose of dowry payments was to sanctify material wealth and also to enhance one’s
status at the time of marriage. 
Unfortunately, in modern times, the practice of making dowry payments has changed
considerably. In many arranged marriages in India and in other countries, dowry payments are
largely involuntary. Further, as Leslie (1998) and others have noted, such payments are now
frequently utilized by the groom’s family to impoverish the bride’s family by extracting large
amounts of monetary and/or material resources as a precondition for marriage. The groom’s family
is able to do this because in India and in other countries where arranged marriages are common,
women tend to occupy an inferior position in the relevant nation’s patrilineal kinship and family
system.
The economic and the social standing of the groom’s family has a significant bearing on the
5Research by economists and by other social scientists provides a clear answer to this first question. Specifically, we learn that in many
arranged marriage settings, the bride and the groom’s families directly negotiate with each other to ascertain the amount of the dowry.
However, this is not always the case and hence the second question of the previous paragraph is germane. For more on these issues,
see Rao (1993), Sharma (1993), Agnihotri (2003), and Dalmia (2004).
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For more on research by economists on alternate aspects of dowries, see Rao (1993), Bloch and Rao (2002), Anderson (2003), Dalmia
(2004), and Dalmia and Lawrence (2005).
4
actual amount of the dowry that is demanded in any particular instance. In this regard, given the
work of Sheel (1999, p. 18), it is fair to say that the higher the socioeconomic standing of the
groom’s family, the higher is generally the demand for dowry. This situation gives rise to two
questions of considerable interest. First, how do the involved parties in an arranged marriage setting
come to an agreement over the actual amount of the dowry payment? Second, if a mediator is used,
how does the presence of this individual influence the dowry offers made by the bride and the
groom’s families? 
There is a large literature in the social sciences on the first question of the previous
paragraph.5 The same is however not true of the second question and hence, in what follows, we
shall be concerned exclusively with this second question. In this regard, the work of Jaggi (2001),
Reddy (2002), and others tells us that in some arranged marriage settings, the two involved parties
conduct the dowry negotiations with the assistance of a mediator. Now, economists have certainly
contributed to increasing our understanding of alternate aspects of dowries.6 Even so, to the best of
our knowledge, the only paper that has explicitly analyzed the tripartite mediator/bride’s
family/groom’s family interaction is the one by Batabyal (2005). 
Batabyal (2005) uses a game model to account for the above mentioned tripartite interaction.
He shows that the Nash equilibrium dowry offers from the bride and the groom optimally trade off
the desire to make an aggressive offer with the likelihood that this offer will be selected by the
7For more on dynamic games of incomplete information, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, section IV) or Gibbons (1992, chapter 4).
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mediator. Now, it should be clear to the reader that a mediator will function most effectively when
he has as much information as possible about the circumstances of a prospective marriage. However,
this information is typically private and hence the best a mediator can do is to learn this information
over time from the observed behavior of the bride’s and the groom’s families. Batabyal’s (2005)
analysis is conducted with a static game of complete information. Therefore, this analysis is unable
to study the implications that learning—about the circumstances of a forthcoming marriage—by a
mediator has on the tripartite mediator/bride’s family/groom’s family interaction.
Given this background, the purpose of our paper is to extend the Batabyal (2005) analysis
by explicitly modeling the learning dimension of the problem and then studying the impact of this
learning on dowry determination in an arranged marriage setting. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. In section 2, we describe our game theoretic model of the dowry determination problem.
Section 3 determines the equilibrium of our game theoretic model and then this section comments
on the salient properties of this equilibrium. Section 4 concludes and offers suggestions for future
research on the subject of this paper.
2. The Game Model
In general, there are several ways in which a mediator can interact with the bride’s family
and with the groom’s family to determine the actual dowry payment. Following Batabyal (2005),
we shall think of the mediator as an arbitrator. Our game model of dowry determination is based on
Gibbons (1988) and the game itself is a dynamic game of incomplete information.7 There are three
players. First, there is a representative from the bride’s family who we shall refer to as the bride 
Second, there is a representative from the groom’s family who we shall refer to as the groom 
8See DeGroot (1970, p. 38) for more on the precision of a normally distributed random variable.
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Finally, there is a mediator who we shall designate with the letter 
The timing of the game between the bride, the groom, and the mediator is as follows. In the
first stage, the bride and the groom simultaneously make dowry offers  and  respectively. In
the second stage, the mediator selects  as the final dowry amount that is agreed upon by
both the bride and the groom. The objective functions are  for the bride,  for the
groom, and  for the mediator, where  is the expectation operator. The reader should
note four things about these three objective functions. First, the bride simply seeks to minimize the
mediator’s expected dowry amount and the groom, in contrast, seeks to maximize this amount.
Second, the mediator’s ideal dowry amount depends on the (random) state of the negotiations about
the prospective marriage between the bride and the groom and we denote this random state variable
by  Third, a key task for our mediator is to learn as much as he possibly can about what the bride
and the groom know about the random state variable  Finally, if we think of  as a “bliss point,”
then our mediator simply wishes to be as close to his bliss point as possible. 
The state variable  is assumed to be normally distributed with mean  and precision 
where the precision of a normally distributed random variable is defined to be the inverse of the
variance.8 The mediator, the bride, and the groom receive noisy signals about  In particular, the
bride and the groom receive the same signal  and our mediator receives the signal
 Like  the random variables  and  are also assumed to be normally distributed
7with means 0, 0, and precisions   respectively. The outstanding task now is to determine the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of our dowry determination game. However, before we proceed with
the computation of the relevant equilibrium, we note three things. First, given the opposing interests
of the bride and the groom in our dowry determination game, pooling equilibria are not particularly
interesting and hence, in the rest of this paper, we focus on a separating equilibrium. Second, in this
separating equilibrium, the sum of the dowry offers by the bride and the groom, i.e.,  perfectly
reveals the signal  to the mediator. Finally, even though the bride and the groom may want to
mislead the mediator’s learning process, in the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium that we
compute, they do not submit misleading dowry offers.
3. The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
To compute the equilibrium of interest, we shall make repeated use of formulae for the
normal learning model presented in DeGroot (1970, pp. 166-172) and in Gibbons (1988, p. 900).
The basic point to recognize here is that the mathematical expectation of a variable given
independent and normally distributed signals is the weighted average of the signals where the
weights are the precisions. 
We now state the central claim of our paper. In the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of interest, the bride and the groom observe the signal  and they then make dowry offers given
by
 and (1)
8In addition, after hearing the dowry offers  and observing the signal  the mediator selects
the offer  which minimizes
(2)
where  is defined implicitly by 
3.1. The optimality of the mediator’s action
We now confirm that our central claim in the previous paragraph is valid. To this end, let us
first verify that the mediator’s action described in equation (2) is indeed a best response. Now, if the
bride and the groom play their equilibrium strategies, then after observing  and  our mediator
assigns probability one to  Undertaking this action is, in effect, the same
as our mediator observing both signals  and  Therefore, the standard multivariate normal
regression model with independent random variables tells us that given the signals  and  the
conditional distribution of the state variable  is normal with mean 
and precision 
We can now state our mediator’s optimization problem. This individual solves
(3)
9Using the law of iterated expectations—see Ross (1996, p. 21) or Wooldridge (2001, p. 29)—the
expectation in equation (3) can be expressed as  
 This last
expression is clearly minimized when  Therefore, we conclude that our mediator is indeed
playing a best response by selecting the dowry offer that is closest to the conditional mean of the
random state variable  given the signals  and 
3.2. The optimality of the bride’s strategy
Having verified the optimality of our mediator’s action, let us now show that the bride is also
playing a best response to the strategies of the groom and the mediator. To this end, first note that
given the strategies of the groom and the mediator, it makes no sense for the bride to offer 
Therefore, for a dowry offer  the bride’s expected payoff is
(4)
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Note that as  varies, the bride affects not only the payoff if her dowry offer is accepted but also
the probability that her offer is accepted by the mediator.
We now wish to demonstrate that the bride’s payoff  is maximized when  To
this end, let  denote the first probability in equation (4) above. Then, it is clear that
(5)
From equation (5) we deduce that  satisfies the first order necessary conditions for a maximum
as long as  Now, to see that this equality does in fact hold, we have to study the 
function in greater detail.
Equation (4), the definition of the  function, and several steps of algebra together tell us
that
(6)
The probability on the extreme right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (6) can be expressed as the
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conditional cumulative distribution function of  given  Let us denote this function by 
Then we have 
(7)
From the standard regression formula it follows that given  the mediator’s signal  is
normally distributed with mean  and precision  Using the above pieces of
information, we can tell that
 and (8)
Now, let us use the formula for the normal density function and the equality on the RHS of (8). This
gives us
(9)
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In addition, using the definition of  (from equation (1)) and the expressions for  and
from equations (8) and (9), we can see that the first order necessary condition for an optimum is
satisfied. Finally, because  and  the second order sufficiency conditions for a
maximum are also satisfied and hence we conclude that the bride is certainly responding optimally
to the behavior of the groom and the mediator.
Computations similar to those we have undertaken in this section tell us that the groom’s
dowry offer in (1) is also a best response. Therefore, equations (1)-(2) do, in fact, describe a
separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the dowry determination game that we have been
analyzing thus far.
3.3. Discussion
A central finding in Batabyal (2005) is that when there is no learning by the mediator, the
equilibrium dowry offers made by the bride and the groom—see equation (11) in that paper—are
centered around the mean of the mediator’s preferred dowry amount. The corresponding and more
general central finding in our paper is that when there is learning by the mediator, the equilibrium
dowry offers made by the bride and the groom—see equation (1)—are centered around the mean
of the conditional distribution of the mediator’s signal  given the signal  received by the bride
and the groom. 
Second, in Batabyal (2005), the difference between the two equilibrium dowry offers is
fundamentally a function of the bride and the groom’s uncertainty about the mediator’s preferred
dowry amount. Specifically, as this uncertainty increased (decreased), the difference between the
two equilibrium dowry offers also increased (decreased). A corresponding result holds in our paper
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as well. Recall that the precision of a normally distributed random variable is the inverse of its
variance. Keeping this in mind and then inspecting equation (1) it is straightforward to confirm that
the difference between the two equilibrium dowry offers is essentially a function of the uncertainty
 about the mediator’s signal. As this uncertainty increases (decreases), the difference
between the two equilibrium dowry offers also increases (decreases).
In addition to the above two points, three additional points concerning the analysis
undertaken in the present paper are worth stressing. First, in the separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, the sum of the two dowry offers  perfectly reveals the bride and the groom’s
signal  to our mediator. Second, in equilibrium, the bride and the groom do not mislead the
mediator with their dowry offers. This is because when these two parties balance the opportunity
to affect the mediator’s belief with the benefit from having a more assertive dowry offer accepted
and the diminished likelihood that this more assertive offer will be accepted, they do not find it in
their interest to mislead the mediator. Finally, when the mediator has nothing to learn, i.e., when 
approaches infinity or when the bride and the groom have nothing to communicate to the mediator,
i.e., when  approaches zero, learning by our mediator plays no role in the analysis undertaken in
this paper.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we extended the analysis in Batabyal (2005) by studying the impact that
learning—about the circumstances of a prospective marriage—by the mediator has on the tripartite
interaction between the bride, the groom, and the mediator. Specifically, we first ascertained the
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optimal dowry offers from the bride and the groom in a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Next, we showed that the mediator perfectly infers the private information of the bride and the
groom from their dowry offers and that he then uses this information in part to select his preferred
dowry offer.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions and in what follows, we
suggest two possible extensions. First, one could analyze the case in which the bride and the groom
receive dissimilar signals about the random state variable  Second, it would be useful to examine
a scenario in which the mediator is able to commit to a particular decision rule before the bride and
the groom submit their dowry offers. Studies that analyze these aspects of the problem will increase
our understanding of the attributes of mediated dowry determination in arranged marriage settings.
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